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Introduction
In the late 1980’s and throughout 1990’s the investment policy in the R&D
sector became progressively cooperative, and research joint ventures proliferated.
Indeed, after positive results of large R&D agreements in US and Japan, even
European ﬁrms started to adopt cooperative investment policies in R&D. As a
consequence of this raising phenomenon of cooperative policies, a large body of
industrial organization literature (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Choi 1989,
Kamien et al 1992, inter alia) examined motives for ﬁrms to pool their R&D
investments. It was found that knowledge generated by research labs is often
valuable to strongly diﬀerent ﬁrms, and alliances in R&D reduce the unnecessary
duplication of eﬀorts which occurs when independent research labs invest in iden-
tical or alike research projects, and enable ﬁrms to take a synergistic advantage
through sharing information. Yet, the impact of R&D cooperation on innovative
activity turned out to be quite ambiguous, this being dependent on the spillovers’
magnitude among ﬁrms. In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Choi (1989),
cooperative R&D determines superior technological advancement with respect to
competitive R&D only if the spillovers are big enough, while in Kamien Muller and
Zang (1992) conducting R&D cooperatively always determines better advancement
that conducting R&D competitively. Moreover, while considering the relation be-
tween cooperative investment policy in R&D and innovative activity, the industrial
organization literature disregarded to analyise the impact of a cooperative invest-
ment policy in R&D on the growth rate of the economy. Surprisingly, scarce
attention has been also paid by endogenous growth theory to this issue (Cozzi
1999, Link, Paton and Siegel 2002, Shapiro 2002): neither incentives for ﬁrms toconduct cooperative investment policy in the R&D sector, nor the main impact
this policy could have on the growth path of the economy have been evaluated by
the growth literature, although it has been recognized that strategic agreements
between research units may strongly aﬀect innovative activity and thus growth(
Jovanovic and Rob 1989, Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Jovanovic and Rousseau
2001).
Thus, taking into account the above mentioned idea of synergistic advantage
as it has been developed in the partial equilibrium approach of industrial orga-
nization, and the surprising gap in the growth theory, we embed this issue into
an endogenous R&D-based growth model. We start considering the economy as
a whole in order to evaluate how its actual functioning (interaction between re-
search labs, risk of failure in innovating, patent laws and so on) shapes ﬁrms’
speciﬁc investment policies. More precisely, we focus on the R&D process as it
really develops in the marke t , a nd ex ami ne what i s the opt i mal i nves tm ent p olic y
for ﬁrms involved in research and whether the selected investment policy in turn
sustains the growth path of the economy. The main questions this model should
answer are whether it is proﬁtable for ﬁr m si n v o l v e di naR & Dr a c et oc o o p e r a t e
in their own investment policy, through sharing information, mergers and so on,
and how this investment policy, as it is actually conducted, aﬀects the innovative
activity and thus the growth path of the economy as a whole.
Then, after analysing how the economic environment may aﬀect ﬁrms’ invest-
ment plans, we propose to identify the decision mechanism, as it develops inside
the ﬁrm, through which an investment policy is deﬁned over time. Accordingly,
we move to an in-depth analysis of the process through which a proﬁt-maximizing9
entity selects a speciﬁc investment policy when it is required to expand its pro-
duction plant in order to satisfy a growing economy. For our purpose, we turn to
an old trend of literature related to the so called plant size problem and developed
since 1950’s by Chanery (1952) and Manne (1961). Most of it has been conceived
and formulated for solving planning problems met by governments in developing
countries (surveys on the main applications of capacity expansion models are pro-
vided by Luss 1982, Li and Tirupati 1992, and Nam and Logendran 1992 ), where
demand expansion was pushed exogenously by the population growth (Bean and
al. 1992, Chaouch and Buzacott 1994, and Ryan 2002, inter alia). Although it
is no longer reasonable to treat ﬁrms as public institutions, and the globalization
of trade has replaced demographic booms in pushing up demand, the plant size
literature can still represent an useful starting point for analyzing the rationale
on which investment policies lie. The basic issue of the plant size approach comes
from the co-existence, in some sectors of the economy, of important economies-
of-scale combined with a signiﬁcant expansion of demand. Delaying investment
is then beneﬁcial for two reasons. First, the present value of the resulting costs
is lower and, second, the increase in demand becoming larger and larger over
time, allows to beneﬁt better from the economies of scale. Accounting for this
and accordingly within the plant size modelling, we investigate the criterion for
investing in a growing economy when ﬁrms are no longer public entities, as in the
original situation, but rather proﬁt maximizing institutions. As such, we assume
that they can accompany their investment policy by a price policy through which
to manipulate the level of demand through time. Then, both of these policies
can be conducted in order to put in balance costs and beneﬁts which derive from
investing. The main ﬁnding provided by this literature since Manne (1961) wasa constant-cycle property in the ﬁrm’ s optimal investment policy, according to
which the ﬁrm installs a new facility of equal size at equally-spaced dates. We
examine the characteristics of the optimal policy of the monopolist in terms of the
periods of time during which the production capacity can be expanded and verify
if this constant-cycle property still holds when the demand function can be shaped
through time.
The ﬁrst issue of how to conduct investment policies in research taking into
account the actual functioning of the economy as a whole is extensively examined
in the ﬁrst part of this work, while the decision mechanism through which the
investment policy is planned by a ﬁrm is considered in the remaining part of the
work. In the following, we provide a brief description of the content of each analysis
and discuss further steps of research which could derive from them.11
Mergers, Innovation, and Inequality
In the late 1980’s and throughout 1990’s a relevant increase in R&D cooperation
was observed, and research joint ventures (RJV) proliferated. While recognizing
that strategic agreements between research units may strongly aﬀect innovative
activity and thus growth, scarce attention has been paid by endogenous growth
theory to this issue (Cozzi, 1999). On the other hand there is a large body of
industrial organization literature (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Choi 1989,
Kamien et al. 1992, inter alia) which examines motives for ﬁrms to pool their
R&D eﬀorts. It is commonly argued that knowledge generated by research labs
is often valuable to strongly diﬀerent ﬁrms, while alliances in R&D reduce the
unnecessary duplication of eﬀorts which occurs when independent research labs
invest in identical or alike research projects, and enable ﬁrms to take a synergistic
advantage through sharing information. Typically, in a context of a two stage
game, ﬁrms are assumed to conduct research in the ﬁrst stage and engage in ei-
ther Bertrand or Cournot competition in the product market in the second stage.
When ﬁrms conduct cooperative R&D, their eﬀorts result in cheaper or better
advancement owing to the internalization of technological spillovers, namely shar-
ing knowledge and useful information, whereas the impact of R&D cooperation
on innovative activity is quite ambiguous, this being dependent on the spillovers’
magnitude among ﬁrms. In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Choi (1989),
cooperative R&D determines superior technological advancement with respect to
competitive R&D only if the spillovers are big enough, while in Kamien Muller and
Zang (1992) conducting R&D cooperatively always determines better advancement
than conducting R&D competitively. Although this literature examines exactlythe relation between R&D cooperation and innovative activity, it is traditionally
concerned with a partial-equilibrium approach.
In this paper we incorporate the issue developed by the industrial organization
literature to an endogenous growth model. We address both the questions exam-
ined by industrial organization models, analysing what induces ﬁrms to cooperate
in research and how R&D cooperation aﬀects innovative activity and growth. We
assume that research activity is an inventing lottery: an inﬁnite number of mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrms are involved in a costly and stochastic R&D race;
only who ﬁrst markets an innovation is rewarded with a patent, the rivals be-
ing temporarily out of the market. While this is a traditional premise of recent
Schumpeterian growth models, the innovation process is deterministic in the in-
dustrial organization approach and the patent protection is usually considered in
a separate frame. Accounting for this inventing lottery enables us to examine very
realistically how R&D cooperation develops when ﬁrms are uncertain whether they
will win the R&D race and will be rewarded for their purposive research eﬀort.
Moreover, we show how cooperative R&D aﬀects research activity and growth re-
gardless of the beneﬁts’ magnitude that ﬁrms may exploit by pooling their research
eﬀorts.
Our model displays also several properties which are interesting in growth the-
ory. We avoid the well-known scale eﬀect suﬀered by the most part of endogenous
growth models and which has been proved by Jones (1995) to be at odd with
the empirical evidence. Recently, there have been many attempts to overcome
this prediction suﬀered by earlier models (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion
and Howitt 1992 and 1998, Jones 1995, Kortum 1997, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
1998, Young 1998, Peretto 1998, Segerstom 1998, Howitt 1999). Although they13
represent important advancements in removing the scale eﬀect property, Jones
(1999) shows that their results are sensitive to the value of parameters at the basis
of the analysis. Here, we provide a new rationale for avoiding the scale eﬀect, with-
out incurring in the criticism formulated by Jones (1999). Further, our analysis
embeds an issue long considered in growth theory, although conﬁned to a separate
set of models (Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krussel 1997, Greenwood and Yorucoglu
1997, Allen 2001), namely the relationship between technological advancement and
wage inequality occurred since the late 1970’s in the US. We illustrate how these
phenomena are linked and provide a new explanation to the radical shift in the
distribution of wages and the high skill premium which emerged when the tech-
nological skill-biased revolution took place (Kremer and Maskin 1999, Acemoglu
1999, 2002).
Our results seem consistent with some well known empirical evidence on inter-
ﬁrm barriers, the related incentives for ﬁrms to cooperate, and the plausible link
between market structure, wage inequality, and growth(Agarwal and Gort 2000).
Neverthless, they have been obtained within the extremely stylized Aghion and
Howitt’s (1992) framework. It would be interesting to extend our logic to an explic-
itly more complex framework, such as for example Aghion et al. (2001). Further-
more, by analyzing US data in the period 1985-1998 Link, Paton and Siegel (2002)
ﬁnd that authorities systematically allow R&D agreements more often when the
country is losing international competitiveness in high technology sectors. While
this ﬁnding is consistent with our claim that policy changes are at the root of the
observed consequence for innovation and in c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,a tt h es a m et i m ei t
suggests to endogenize industrial policy in an explicit international setting. These
will be topics for further work.Capacity Expansion and Dynamic Monopoly
Pricing
The so-called plant-size problem introduced in the ﬁfties by Chenery (1952)
studies the optimal capacity to install in order to serve an exogenous demand in-
creasing over time, with economies of scale in plant construction. This problem
arose in the context of developing countries: explosive demographics forced the
governments to regularly increase capacity over time, in order to face increase in
demand resulting from such populations’ booms. Increasing returns to scale in
plant construction opened the door to the possibility of anticipating the incre-
ments of capacity required to meet future demand levels, and exploiting thereby
the resulting economies of scale. Manne (1961) and (1967) starting from the ca-
pacity expansion problem which was met by several manufacturing facilities in
India, examined the rationale behind the optimal investment policy faced by pub-
lic institutions. Assuming an exogenous demand growing linearly over time and
economies of scale in investment costs, he ﬁnds that the optimal investment policy
is constant-cycle : successive investments are all of the same size and undertaken
at equally spaced points of time.
While in this context, it was reasonable to assume that demand expansion was
pushed exogenously by the population growth, today, in developed countries, sim-
ilar demand booms are still observed in several industries, but for other reasons
than an exogenous population growth. Indeed, markets in developed countries
expanded initially around local or national demands, whereas now they are pro-
gressively concerned by larger and larger geographical areas. In these areas, ﬁrms
do not act as public institutions, but rather as proﬁt maximizing companies. As15
such, they accompany their investment policy by a price policy through which they
can manipulate the levels of demand through time. Although the seminal paper
by Manne has been extended in several directions (Srinivasan 1967, Gabszewicz
and Vial 1972, Nickell 1977, Freidenfelds 1981, Bean and al. 1992, Chaouch and
Buzacott 1994, and Ryan 2002 inter alia), these research contributions assume
that demand for capacity increases is exogenously given, and cannot be adjusted
through some price policy.
In order to catch the strategic possibility for a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm to manip-
ulate the demand function through price, we study in the present paper a similar
plant size problem as in Chenery (1952) and Manne (1961). Yet we now allow
the proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm producing the good to combine its investment policy
with a product price policy adjusting demand upwards, or downwards, over time.
More precisely, we suppose that, at each point of time, market demand is given by
a linear function of instantaneous price, the intercept of which increases linearly
with time. Moreover, we make the assumption alluded to above concerning the
size of the investments, namely, we ﬁx a sequence of equally spaced points of time
at which the investments for adding capacity may be undertaken and characterize
the optimal policy of the monopolist in terms of price regime and investment’s size.
This extension has to cope with the diﬃculty that, even if the volume demanded
is exogenously increasing (or decreasing) at each price over time, the ﬁrm can now
decrease or increase it by instantaneous increases or decreases in the price pat-
tern. We characterize the optimal price and investment policies of the monopolist
under the assumption that the ﬁrm while controlling the size of the investments
to be undertaken, does not control the dates, which are assumed to be equally
spaced through time, at which these investments have to be consented. Our ﬁnd-ings are as follows. The optimal price policy, through which the monopolist can
dampen or enhance the expansion of demand through time, leads to an investment
pattern with increments of capacity which are either constant over time at each
investment date, or start to become constant after a ﬁnite set of investment dates.
Furthermore, the optimal price pattern between two dates at which new capacity is
installed may follow two diﬀerent directions: either the price pattern is such that
total existing capacity is fully used at each instant between these dates; or the
instantaneous monopoly price is used for some period within the cycle and, there-
after, until the end of the cycle, the price which dampens instantaneous demand
at the level of installed capacity is adopted. Finally, we show that the optimal
constant increment of capacity is smaller than the one which would have been se-
lected by a planner facing a demand growing exogenously at a rate corresponding
to the instantaneous monopoly price, as in Manne (1961).
Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of
Investments
Adding facilities to optimally meet rising demand for these facilities is one
of the most debated issue in all the industries which are characterized by trade-
oﬀs in decision making process due to economies of scale in investment costs or
commitment of substantial resources for further capacity. Typical examples are
given by heavy process industries, communication network, and water resources
systems. Research on this topic has been pursued since the sixties in the context
of developing countries where explosive demographics forced the governments to
regularly increase capacity over time, in order to face increases in demand resulting17
from such populations’ booms. Assuming an exogenous demand growing linearly
over time and economies of scale in investment costs, Manne (1961 and 1967) in
his pioneristic work, found that the optimal investment policy is constant-cycle:
successive investments are all of the same size and undertaken at equally spaced
points of time. These ﬁndings were extended in several directions (Srinivasan 1967,
D’Aspremont Gabszewicz and Vial 1972, Gabszewicz and Vial 1972), and variants
of the capacity expansion model as it was formulated by Manne (1961) were used
for several application to public services (see Luss 1982, Li and Tirupati 1992, and
Nam and Logendran 1992 for a survey of the capacity expansion problem in OR
and its main applications).
While in the context of developing countries, it was reasonable to assume that
demand expansion was pushed exogenously by the population growth, today sim-
ilar demand booms are observed for other reasons than an exogenous population
growth. Indeed, they mainly derive from the globalisation of trade which makes
industries progressively concerned with larger and larger geographical areas to be
served.
Further, mainly in response to the failure of state-owned entities to meet the
growing needs of customers, many public utilities have been progressively changed
into private institutions, namely proﬁt maximizing entities. As such, they are
a l l o w e dt ou s ea c c o r d i n gt oap r o ﬁt-maximization criterion speciﬁci n s t r u m e n t s
which were not available at the time when public utilities were required to satisfy
the demand function, e.g. they can adopt a price policy in order to manipulate
the demand function over time consistently with their installed capacity.
Accordingly, we propose to relax the assumption of exogenous demand in-
crease and replace it by an assumption about the time expansion of a demandfunction specifying how instantaneous demand varies with price at each point of
time. More precisely, we consider a monopoly producing a good whose intercept
of its demand function grows linearly over time: at each price demand expands
through time as the intercept of the demand function grows. Whatever the price
policy that has been adopted at each instant, the monopolist must invest in order
to meet the resulting demand growth. Further, the monopolist can only invest
in indivisible factory units. The problem we would like to study in this paper is
the following. What is the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence
of investment time points the monopolist should select through time ? This is
nothing else than the so-called capacity expansion problem formulated by Chenery
(1952) and Manne (1961). Yet, now it examined the timing of capacity additions
which is deﬁned on the basis of a price manipulation, when the expansion capacity
consists of a new factory.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. The optimal price policy, through which the
monopolist can possibly dampen or enhance the expansion of demand through
time, leads to a sequence of time points when to install a new factory which are
equally spaced. Furthermore, the optimal price pattern between two dates at which
a new factory is installed falls into two categories: either the price pattern is such
that total existing capacity which results from the number of installed factories
is fully used at each instant between these dates; or the instantaneous monopoly
price is used for some period within these dates and, thereafter, until the point
of time when a new factory is installed, the price which dampens instantaneous
demand at the level of installed factory is adopted. Finally, we show that the
optimal sequence of time points when new factories are installed determines cycles
which are longer than the ones which would have been selected by a planner19
facing a demand growing exogenously at a rate corresponding to the instantaneous
monopoly price, as in Manne (1961). This paper is also related to other bulks of
literature. First, it is concerned with the application of microeconomic models of
discontinuous adjustments (retail inventories, expansion of capacity, cash balances,
prices, durable goods etc.) to the aggregate economic behavior (Abel and Eberly
1996, Caplin and Spulber 1987, Caballero and Engel 1991 and 1999, inter alia).
In particular, on the basis of Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel
(1991) have developed a methodology which allows to explain why the economic
behaviour of the aggregate investment displays a smooth pattern at the aggregate
level, while individual production units adjusting discretely and by large amount.
Although this approach has been conceived within the framework of (S,s) policy, it
can still be applied, with minor changes, to our model and thus used for evaluating
macroeconomic implications of investment policy in terms of capacity expansion
as it is deﬁned at a plant level. Second, the stationarity property we ﬁnd also holds
in models concerned with the optimal timing of replacement investments. These
replacement models assume that the technological progress is embodied in new
equipment and accordingly examine when it is optimal replacing the oldest capital
with the most recent vintages. The endogenous scrapping time, namely the age
of the oldest machines, which is determined by the replacement timing selected
by ﬁrms, is proved to be constant over time, under several diﬀerent conditions
(Malcomson 1975, Van Hilten 1991, Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro 1997,
Boucekkine del Rio and Licandro 1999). Although our speciﬁcation, as it is, does
not focus on the replacement problem, our modeling ﬁts into the literature on
replacement decision. With slightly changes, we could assume that a factory is
required to replace its equipment which deteriorates with new machines ratherthan to expand its capacity to meet a rising demand, and then evaluating at the
optimal price policy the ensuing timing of replacement.
The rationale we develop in this model can easily be applied to the inven-
tory problem when the ﬁrm is allowed to manipulate the selling price in order
to accelerate or dampen the demand through its price policy at the exit of the
warehouse.
Finally, it could be interesting to apply this model to industries where a pri-
vatization process has taken place and planning investments becomes crucial for
ﬁrms to survive (e.g. air travel industry).21
CHAPTER 1.
Mergers, Innovation, and Inequality
Guido Cozzi and Ornella Tarola
Abstract.
This paper presents a standard endogenous growth framework in which the
source of growth is represented by vertical innovation. The crucial assumption
we introduce is that there is a positive information gap concerning the discovery
of innovation. The aim of reducing the information dissemination lag provides
incentives for ﬁrms to decide to merge their research eﬀorts. At the same time we
ﬁnd that the skilled/unskilled wage gap is strongly related to this phenomenon.
We prove that changing antitrust attitudes toward eﬃcienc-motivated mergers in
contestable industries may simultaneously explain observed changes in the indus-
try structure, in qualitative innovation, in wage inequality, and in labor supply
composition.1.1 Introduction
In the late 1980’s and throughout 1990’s a relevant increase in R&D cooperation
was observed, and research joint ventures (RJV) proliferated. The positive results
of large R&D agreements in US and Japan (such as the VLSI Circuit Association
in Japan and SEMATECH in the US) stimulated even European ﬁrm to conduct
cooperative R&D. While recognizing that strategic agreement between research
units may strongly aﬀect innovative activity and thus growth, scarce attention has
been paid by endogenous growth theory to this issue (Cozzi, 1999). On the other
hand there is a large body of industrial organization literature (d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin 1988, Choi 1989, Kamien et al. 1992, inter alia) which examines motives
for ﬁrms to pool their R&D eﬀorts. It is commonly argued that knowledge gener-
ated by research labs is often valuable to strongly diﬀerent ﬁrms, while alliances in
R&D reduce the unnecessary duplication of eﬀort which occurs when independent
research labs invest in identical or alike research projects, and enable ﬁrms to take
a synergistic advantage through sharing information. "The alleged advantage of a
research joint ventures, aside from enabling the participants to overcome a cost-
of-development barrier impenetrable to any one of them alone, is the elimination
of duplication eﬀort..." (Kamien Muller and Zang, 1992, p.1293). Tipically, in a
context of a two stage game, ﬁrms are assumed to conduct research in the ﬁrst
stage and engage in either Bertrand or Cournot competition in the product mar-
ket in the second stage. When ﬁrms conduct cooperative R&D, their eﬀorts result
in cheaper or better advancement owing to the internalization of technological
spillovers, namely sharing knowledge and useful information, whereas the impact
of R&D cooperation on innovative activity is quite ambiguous, this being depen-23
dent on the spillovers’magnitude among ﬁrms. In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) and Choi (1989), cooperative R&D determines superior technological ad-
vancement with respect to competitive R&D only if the spillovers are big enough,
while in Kamien Muller and Zang (1992) conducting R&D cooperatively always
determines better advancement than conducting R&D competitively. Although
this literature examines exactly the relation between R&D cooperation and inno-
vative activity, it is traditionally concerned with a partial-equilibrium approach.
In this paper we incorporate the issue developed by the industrial organization
literature to an endogenous growth model. We address both the questions exam-
ined by industrial organization models, analysing what induces ﬁrms to cooperate
in research and how R&D cooperation aﬀects innovative activity and growth. We
assume that research activity is an inventing lottery: an inﬁnite number of mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrms are involved in a costly and stochastic R&D race;
only who ﬁrst markets an innovation is rewarded with a patent, the rivals be-
ing temporarily out of the market. While this is a traditional premise of recent
Schumpeterian growth models, the innovation process is deterministic in the in-
dustrial organization approach and the patent protection is usually considered in a
separate frame  . A ccount ing f or this i nve nting lottery enables us t o e xami ne ve ry
realistically how R&D cooperation develops when ﬁrms are uncertain whether they
will win the R&D race and will be rewarded for their purposive research eﬀort.
Moreover, we show how cooperative R&D aﬀects research activity and growth re-
gardless of the beneﬁts’magnitude that ﬁrms may exploit by pooling their research
eﬀorts.Our model displays also several properties which are interesting in growth
theory. We avoid the well-known scale eﬀect suﬀered by the most part of en-
dogenous growth models and which has been proved by Jones (1995) to be at odd
with the empirical evidence. Recently, there have been many attempts to overcome
this prediction suﬀered by earlier models (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion
and Howitt 1992, etc.). Jones (1995), Kortum (1997) and Segerstom (1998) as-
sume that the arrival rate of innovation decreases with level of knowledge; while
Howitt (1999), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1998), Young (1998), and Peretto
(1998) consider horizontal and vertical innovations jointly. Although they repre-
sent important advancements in removing the scale eﬀect property, Jones (1999)
shows that their results are sensitive to the value of parameters at the basis of the
analysis. Here, we provide a new rationale for avoiding the scale eﬀect, without
incurring in the criticism formulated by Jones (1999). Further, our analysis em-
beds an issue long considered in growth theory, although conﬁned to a separate
set of models (Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krussel 1997, Greenwood and Yorucoglu
1997, Allen 2001), namely the relationship between technological advancement and
wage inequality occurred since the late 1970’s in the US. We illustrate how these
phenomena are linked and provide a new explanation to the radical shift in the
distribution of wages and the high skill premium which emerged when the tech-
nological skill-biased revolution took place (Kremer and Maskin 1999, Acemoglu
1999, 2002).
We analyse the innovation activity in an endogenous growth model sharing
several features with the well-known Aghion and Howitt’s (1992 and 1998) basic25
Schumpeterian model, in which the source of growth is represented by vertical
(product quality improving) innovation. We distinguish between the research pro-
cess addressed to invent new products (discovery) and the process which makes
these inventions marketable (commercialization). While the discovery is deter-
mined by a stochastic process, the commercialization of new products occurs when
a patent has been granted to the inventor of this novel, in order to prevent rivals
from using, producing and selling the invention. When a patent application is
ﬁled, a patent examiner, in determining patentability, must ﬁnd that the inven-
tion is useful, novel, and non-obvious and this examination process takes time. As
no disclosure is required b e fore getting a patent  , the ti me wh en t h e d is cove ry of
innovation is made by a ﬁrst ﬁrm is unknown by the other ﬁrms up to the time
when a patent is granted. Thus, there is a period of time when rival ﬁrms do
unnecessary research eﬀort. This information-gap determines a duplication of ef-
fort’s risk (usually mentioned in the industrial organization literature) and makes
R&D cooperation proﬁtable. Further, as the probability of a ﬁrm’s winning the
R&D race decreases with the number of ﬁrms in the market, cooperative R&D
always makes more valuable innovating and increases, ceteris paribus, the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled labor. Moreover, it leads to better technolog-
ical advancements than competitive R&D, regardless of the duration of patent
examination which only aﬀects the magnitude of the beneﬁts for ﬁrms to pool
eﬀorts. Finally, this information dissemination lag puts an upper bound to the
growth rate of income removing th e s cale eﬀect prop erty  dis played by Aghi on
and Howitt (1992).






where r is a constant rate of time preference.
Due to perfect capital markets and linear preferences, the equilibrium interest
rate will be constant and equal to r.
Each individual is endowed with a unit ﬂow of labor, either unskilled labor M
or skilled labor L.
Unskilled labor is only used to produce the ﬁnal consumption good according
to the following production function
y = F(M,x)=AM1−αxα
where A is a productivity parameter and x t h ei n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t s .A sM is used
in a ﬁxed amount, it can be normalized to one.
Skilled labor is devoted to the innovation process. This process consists in dis-
co v e r i n g and producing new inputs whose use increases t he te chnology parameter
by γ.
The discovery process is modeled as a R&D race. A ﬂow of skilled labor, say n,
competes in research-labs for inventing new types of intermediate goods. Inventions
t =0 ,1... occur with a Poisson arrival rate λn where λ represents the productivity
of research technol ogy .Theonewhoﬁ rst invents a new inte rmediate go o d obtains
after a ﬁxed time δ a patent on the newest input. Let τt be the discovery time
of inputs t,t h e nτt + δ is the time when these new inputs become marketable.27
Between τt and τt +δ no proﬁt is earned and the invention is not disclosed by the
successful innovator. Thus, during this time competitors of the unknown innovator
still seek to discover an existing, although not disclosed, generation t of inputs.
Assume that the R&D race for inventing the generation t of inputs starts at
time 0.A ts o m et i m eτ>0 no invention occurred yet.
If τ ≥ δ − τt, then the time when new inputs could have been invented is just
δ, otherwise the invention would have been already marketed.
If δ>τ−τt, namely the time for obtaining a patent has not elapsed since the
R&D race started, then the time when the new type of inputs has been invented
while not patented, is (τ − τt).
Let τδ be the time when new type of inputs could have been discovered and
not yet disclosed. Then, the following holds:
τδ = min{δ,τ − τt}
where τ is any istant of time after the discovery at time τt of inputs t.
As the innovating follows a Poisson process, the distribution of this random
variable τδ is:
F (τδ)=1− e−λnτδ
Thereinafter we focus on τδ = δ.
Once discovered and patented, new inputs are produced by skilled labor in an
intermed iate sector accordin g t o a one-for-one relation  and s old to t he ﬁnal output
sect or . Accounting for t he two comp eting uses of skilled lab or, the skilled-lab ormarket equilibrium equation writes:
Lt = xt + nt (1)
The innovator having an exclusive right on the newest intermediate input, due
to the patent can monopolize the intermediate sector and quote a monopoly price
while selling intermediate goods to the ﬁnal output sector.
Then, the proﬁt accruing to this monopolist is as follows:
πt = max(pt − wt)xt
where the wage rate of skilled labor wt used for producing inputs xt is taken as
given. The wage rate of unskilled workers is given by wu.
As the ﬁnal output is assumed to be perfectly competitive, the price pt of the
intermediate input xt must be equal to its marginal productivity, namely
pt = Atαxα−1







wtxt ≡ At˜ π(ωt) (2)
where ωt ≡ wt/At is the productivity adjusted skilled wage and ˜ π(ωt) is produc-
tivity adjusted proﬁt.29
1.3 Balanced Growth
When deﬁning the amount of skilled labor to employ in the discovery process,
a ﬁrm maximizes the ﬂow of expected proﬁt from discovering and patenting the
invention.
Denote by Vt+1 the value of generation t+1of inputs: as the present value of a
higher quality intermediate good appears a time δ after its discovery, and because
any ﬁrm which competes in research the term has a probability e−λδ
R δ
0 nt(s)ds to
win th e R&D race  ,the ﬂow o f p r o ﬁts from research wri tes:
e−λδ
R δ
0 nt(s)dsλVt+1e−rδ − wtnt
The integral
R δ
0 nt(s)ds mirrors the uncertainty of the innovation process: be-
cause the time of the new discovery is unknown, the longer the time from the
beginning of R&D race, the lower the success probability from an individual ﬁrm’s
perspective if no invention has been marketed during that time, and the lower the
incentive to conduct research, namely the skilled labor to employ in research. It
is easy to show that this integral converges to a stationary equilibrium and the
equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
Proposition 1
R δ
0 nt(s)ds has a stationary solution nt. This solution is asymp-
totically stable.
Proof. See appendix.
From standard computations we get t he following arbitrage condition  :
wt = e−λδntλVt+1e−rδ (3)Each innovation is assumed to be drastic, namely each type of inputs is replaced
by the next vintage. So, while the patent lasts forever, the monopoly rent expires
at the time when a new innovation occurs in the market (A-H 1992, p.328). This
time is postponed for δ compared with the discovery time. Thus, the present value
of returns from discovering and patenting the higher quality intermediate goods is
equal to the proﬁt ﬂow
∞ Z
0
πt+1e−rτdτ, stemming from the innovation t+1, minus
the capital loss suﬀered from being replaced, with probability λnt+1, by a new
innovator at time τt+1+ δ,w h e r eτt+1 is the discovery time of the generation t+1
of inputs.
From the discovery of new inputs up to the replacement of the older ones, the





Then, the capital loss is given by
¡
Vt+1 − ¯ Vt+1
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Vt+1 − ¯ Vt+1
¢¤
/r (5)
Notice that the value of capital loss, accounting for the time when the invention is
marketable, results lower than the one which would have been suﬀered if invention
would have been immediately patentable.
By combining both (5) and (4), we ﬁnally get:
Vt+1 =










As usual, in (6) the denominator includes both the interest rate r and the creative-
destruction rate λnt+1: the higher the research level in the next period, the higher
thecreative-destructionrateandthelowerthepresentvalue ofaninnovation .
By combining (3) and (6), and given the relationship between π(w) and










Our balanced growth analysis follows the one performed by Aghion-Howitt






r + λ¯ n
¡
1 − e−rδ¢¤
˜ π (ω(N − ¯ n))/r
r + λ¯ n
(8)
¯ n is higher the lower the interest rate r as a reduction of r positively aﬀects
V , the higher the size of innovation γ as it increases the proﬁts attainable from
the new discovery, and the higher the arrival rate of innovation λ as it improves
the p ro ductivity in research . F inally, the research employ ment at equilibrium
still increases with the labor force L, as it reduces the wage rate of skilled work-
ers. Yet, the discovery’s uncertainty stemming from the information-dissemination
lag intro duces a c ongestion in t he research sector: t he higher the amount of la-
bor devoted to research, the lower the chance of winning the R&D race from an
individual ﬁrm’s perspective and the less proﬁtable to invest in R&D activities.
Then, the following holds:
Proposition 2 Any increase in the labor force L, namely in the population size,
does not raise the research labor proportionally.Proof. See appendix.
As far as balanced growth is concerned, the ﬁnal output good during the time
interval t can be written as
yt = At(L − ¯ n)α
from which it follows that
yt+1 = γyt
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998) we can write
lny (τ +1 )=l ny(τ)+ε(τ)
where ε the number of innovations between τ and τ +1 . Research-ﬁrms need
the current innovation to be disclosed before thinking of a newer generation of
inputs, and an innovation is disclosed only when the patent process ends, then
there is a lag between the time when the research process t closes and the one t+1
starts. Thus, the number of innovations ε is bounded above. Further, due to the
information-dissemination lag δ on the current invention, no ﬁrm starts to work
on the next vintage, while investing with nil probability of success on the current
invention if the discovery has occured although not been disclosed. The research
process is governed by a Poisson process, then the average growth rate AGR of














j! j which is bounded above by κ ≡ 1
δ.T h el a gi n
disseminating informations eliminates the well-known scale eﬀect which has been
proved by Jones (1995) to be at odds with the empirical evidence. The scale eﬀect
predicted by several endogenous growth models states that if the amount of re-
sources in the research sector doubles, then the per-capita growth rate should dou-
ble as well Recently, several models have been developed with the aim of avoiding
this prediction. A ﬁrst class of models (Jones 1995, Kortum 1997, and Segerstom
1998) assumes that the arrival rate of innovation decreases with level of knowledge,
namely a larger economy needs to invest a larger amount of resources in R&D to
get a constant growth rate of productivity as the number of goods to be improved
is higher. An alternative approach (Dinopoulos and Segerstom 1998, Howitt 1999,
Peretto 1998, Young, 1998) assumes that research can increase either the quality
of goods within a product line or expand the number of the available goods. Then,
the growth rate is determined by the research investment in each product line. As
increasing the population size is reﬂected on extending proportionally the num-
bers of product lines, without aﬀecting the research eﬀort in each sector, the scale
eﬀect is totally dissipated. Although these formulations represent advancements
in removing the scale eﬀect, their ﬁndings are sensitive to the value of param-
eters on which the analysis is performed. Concerning the ﬁrst class of models,
the scale eﬀect disappears only if diminishing returns in the production of new
ideas are imposed. Further, according to this formulation policy does not aﬀect
the long-run growth rate, which is in sharp contrast with the endogenous growththeory’s ﬂavour. This scale eﬀe c tp r o b l e mi sn o te v e ns o l v e di nt h ea l t e r n a t i v e
approach. Adding a new dimension to the innovation activity, namely horizontal
innovation, removes the scale eﬀect only if the number of the product lines grows
proportionally with population; otherwise, if it increases less (res. more) than
proportionally, a positive (res. negative) scale eﬀect still occurs. In this slightly
modiﬁed version of Aghion and Howitt model (1992), the information lag puts
an upper bound to the average growth rate such that the scale-eﬀect of Aghion
and Howitt (1992) disappears while leaving unaﬀected the main properties of the
original model.
Then, we can claim the following:
Proposition 3 The information/dissemination lag puts an upper bound to per-
capita growth rate, regardless of the amount of skilled labor, thereby eliminating
the well known scale eﬀect property proved by Jones (1995) to be inconsistent with
existing data.
1.4 Concentration and Cooperation in the R&D
Sector
The main feature of the decentralized setting is the congestion phenomenon
due to the information gap aﬀecting negatively research eﬀort. This is rather
realistic in an economy in which a large number of small ﬁrms undertake indepen-
dent R&D projects. In the model of the previous section this was stylized by the
assumption of zero-measure ﬁrms. Though in the real industrial world it is fre-
quent for small ﬁrms to exchange some relevant information with each other, the
character of a ﬁrm as an information barrier (Jovanovic and Rob 1989, Jovanovic35
and MacDonald 1994, Jovanovic and Rousseau 2001) provides strong incentives
for ﬁrms to merge their R&D units or to let them cooperate (Cozzi 1999). In this
model with free entry, tradable factors, and constant returns, homogeneous R&D
workers extract all producers’ surplus generated: so large ﬁrms can be equivalently
seen as skilled workers’ R&D associations. The aim of reducing the information
dissemination lag provides a natural motivation for R&D ﬁrms to merge and/ for
R&D workers to cooperate with each other.O f c o u r s e ,t h e a n t i t rust authorities
should worry that a cartel of R&D producers might refrain from innovation by
internalizing the business stealing externality. Then we investigate which ﬁrm size
is the more adequate system to overcome this sort of congestion without discour-
aging aggressive innovative activity. The aim of this section is precisely to deﬁne
the number of research-ﬁrms that maximizes growth, verifying the relationship
between the number of research-ﬁrms and research eﬀort. We can assume that
the antitrust authorities impose that each R&D ﬁrm size be not larger than one
N th of the marke t  . S ince all researchers woul d want t o work in the biggest R&D
ﬁrms (because the duplication risk is smaller) exactly N research-ﬁrms participate
in the R&D race. Each research-ﬁrm i devotes exactly ni





where nt is the total amount of labor employed in the research-sector.
In the determination of its R&D eﬀort each ﬁrm cares about the probability
of winning the R&D race. This is inversely related to R&D eﬀort of the other
research-ﬁrms.














N ntτδ refers to the probability of success for the ﬁrm i. It is expressed
in terms of the number of research-ﬁrms working in the market and total amount
of labor employed in R&D. It easy to see that RHS is a decreasing function of N.
The following holds:
Proposition 4 The higher the number of non-cooperating research ﬁrms, N,t h e
lower the probability of a ﬁrm’s winning the R&D race, the lower the expected
value of an hour in research. The higher the number of ﬁrms in the market the
stronger the eﬀects of the information-gap, the lower the expected aggregate growth
rate, and the lower the skilled/unskilled wage gap.
Proof. See appendix.
As the R&D eﬀort is inversely related to the number of research-ﬁrms and
the higher the research-eﬀort the higher the average growth rate of the economy
the best solution under laissez-faire is obtained when a minimum number of ﬁrms
operate in the market that is when N =2 . Since skilled workers are always better
oﬀ the relatively larger their R&D ﬁrm we can conclude:
Corollary 5 An antitrust policy that seeks to maximize growth would allow the
formation of a non-collusive duopoly in the R&D sector, which would immediately
form.37
Notice that here the duopoly emerges endogenously as R&D workers would
tend to unify their eﬀort, but the antitrust authorities can allow or ban it. Hence
at the R&D stage every duopolist is under the constant threat of possible free
entrants (defector groups of workers). Therefore all proﬁts are dissipated into
skilled wage.
1.4.1 Monopoly or Duopoly?
Should the antitrust authority allow R&D ﬁrms to join a unique ﬁrm, that
will b ecome the unique intermedi ate go o d monop ol ist ? We j us t n eed to compare
(10) with N =2to the following arbitrage condition of the monopolist:
ωt = λ
(γ − 1) ˜ πt+1
r
(11)
and conclude that the larger the information lag, the higher the quality jump, and
the more populated the economy the more innovative the monopoly compared to
the duopoly. Reminding the reader that in this representative sector model the
monopoly should be correctly interpreted as belonging to an inﬁmum sub-sector
of the whole economy, it may be interesting to note that our analysis implies
that - ceteris paribus - when a large area integrates economically it is more likely
that antitrust authorities concerned with innovation would decide to allow more
concentration than in smaller areas. The reason is that with a large skilled labor
mass working for the rival each duopolist would seriously fear that its potential
discovery could already be - or will soon become - obsolete.
1.5 Endogenous SkillsUp to now we have being following Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) assumption of
a ﬁxed composition of the labor supply between skilled and unskilled workers. In
this section we show that our analysis allows to relate eﬃciency enhancing mergers
to the endogenous composition of the labor force.
Indeed it is straightforward to endogenize the supply of skills in this econ-
omy, by adapting Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (1999) methodology to the closed
economy framework . We assume that individuals are ﬁnitely lived members of
inﬁnitely lived households, being continuously born at rate β, and dying at rate
d,w i t hg = β − d>0;l e tL0 the population size at time zero, then at time τ it
results equal to L(τ)=L0egτ. D>0 denotes the exogenously given duration of
their life. Then, as the number of births at time τ is equal to the number of deaths
at time τ + D, it follows that β = gegD/(egD − 1). People are altruistic in that
they care about their household’s total discounted utility according to the usual
intertemporally additive functional. They choose to train and become skilled at
the beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their training period -
in which the individual cannot work - is exogenously ﬁxed as T<D .
Hence an individual with ability θ ∈ [0,1] uniformly distributed decides to










e−r(s−τ) max(θ − γ,0)w(s)ds
#
,
with 0 <γ<1/2,a n dw i t hEτ denoting expectations as of time τ.N o t i c et h a ta n
individual of ability θ>γis postulated able to accumulate skill (human capital)
θ − γ after training, while individuals with too low ability (θ<γ )n e v e rg e ta n y39
skill from schooling.
As Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) we focus on the steady state (balanced
growth) analysis, in which all variables - and real wages in particular - are expected
to grow at the same constant expected growth rate as At. Hence any individual





where σ>0 is a parameter dependent constant and θ0 results from (12) holding









while the remaining fraction of population (1 − θ0)L(τ) is either involved in train-
ing or skilled. Accounting for the duration of the training process, it is easy to
deﬁne a subpopulation of individuals born between τ−D and τ−T which is skilled
at some time τ, namely:
Z τ−T
τ−D












As the average of skilled workers completing the training process is equal to
[(θ0 − γ)/2+( 1− γ)/2], then the aggregate supply of skilled labor at time τ inunits of eﬃciency is:
Ls(τ)=( θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φL(τ)/2 (14)
with 0 <φ<1.
Since the fraction of the population that decides to get skilled is only depen-
dent on the productivity adjusted skilled/unskilled wage ratio and on parameters
the results of the previous sections continue to hold and we can state:
Proposition 6 T h el o w e rt h en u m b e ro fn o n - c o o p e r a t i n gR & Dﬁrms, N,t h e
higher expected aggregate growth rate, the higher the skilled/unskilled wage gap,
and the larger the fraction of population that decides to get skilled.
Proof. Just repeat the proof of Proposition 1 using (13) and (14) instead of
M =1and L. Q.E.D.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that due to the information gap between research
ﬁrms a kind of congestion appears in the R&D sector. This phenomenon, reducing
the research eﬀort, aﬀects growth negatively. Moreover as R&D eﬀort is inversely
related to the number of non-cooperating research ﬁrms, we conclude that the
best growth-enhancing policy under laissez-faire is to allow at least a contestable
duopoly for each innovative industry. It seems interesting that the information
dissemination lag allows us to capture in a uniﬁed framework phenomena – such
as wage distribution, R&D cooperation and their interplay – analyzed in often
unrelated investigations, although with similar time pattern.41
W ec a nr e - i n t e r p r e ts o m er e c e n tt r e n d si nt h eU Sa n dE Ui nt h el i g h to f
our simple model’s results. Since the mid 70’s - also due to weaker international
barriers and ﬁerce competition by newly industrialized countries - US and EU
authorities have relaxed their antitrust policy against either mergers or R&D co-
operation in order to improve their competitiveness. This has stimulated R&D
eﬀorts, reduced innovation delay (see Agarwal and Gort, 2000), improved product
qualities at a faster rate, and at the same time it has increased wage inequality
and the fraction of the highly educated population.
Our results seem consistent with some well known empirical evidence on
inteﬁrm barriers, the related incentives for ﬁrms to cooperate, and the plausible
link between market structure, wage inequality, and growth. Neverthless, they
have been obtained within the extremely stylized Aghion and Howitt’s (1992)
framework. It would be interesting to extend our logic to an explicitly more
complex framework, such as for example Aghion et al. (2001). Moreover, by
analyzing US data in the period 1985-1998 Link, Paton and Siegel (2002) ﬁnd that
authorities systematically allow R&D agreements more often when the country is
losing international competitiveness in high technology sectors. This ﬁnding is
consistent with our claim that policy changes are at the root of the observed
consequence for innovation and income distribution. At the same time it suggests
to endogenize industrial policy in an explicit international setting. These will be
topics for further work.1.7 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Let ω(x) ≡ F0(x)+xF00(x) be the marginal-
revenue function. As F(x)=Axα, then the marginal-revenue function can be
manipulated and expressed as follows:
ω(x)=α2xα−1
Combining the previous expression with (7) and (1), we get:























0 nt(s)ds, given Z(0) = 0.
Standard computations yields to
¯ Z =l n ( L/ ˜ W)/(λ/(1 − α))
where ˜ W =( W/α2)1/(α−1).43
As it follows that F0( ¯ Z) < 0 for any value of parameters, ¯ Z turns out to be
an asymptotically stable rest point. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .By manipulating the (8) it follows
ω = e−λδ¯ nλγe−rδ
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∂N < 0 and
∂φ(•)
∂nt < 0 that is the lower the number of research-ﬁrms the
higher the equilibrium eﬀort in R&D and the higher the average growth rate of
the economy. The other statements follow straightforwardly. Q.E.D.45
CHAPTER 2.
Capacity Expansion and Dynamic Monopoly
Pricing
S. Demichelis and O. Tarola
Abstract.
We substitute to the plant size problem, as investigated by Chenery (1952), a
new version in which a proﬁt-maximising monopolist may combine its investment
policy with a price policy adjusting demand upwards or downwards over time. We
characterize the optimal price and investment policies. The optimal price policy
determines an investment pattern either with constant increments of capacity over
time, or becoming constant after a ﬁnite time. The existing capacity is either
fully used at each instant between two investment dates; or the monopolist ﬁrst
quotes the instantaneous monopoly price and, thereafter, the price dampening
instantaneous demand at the optimal installed capacity level2.1 Introduction
The so-called plant-size problem introduced in the ﬁfties by Chenery (1952)
studies the optimal capacity to install in order to serve an exogenous demand
increasing over time, with economies of scale in plant construction. This problem
arose in the context of developing countries: explosive demographics forced the
governments to regularly increase capacity over time, in order to face increase
in demand resulting from such populations’ booms. Increasing returns to scale in
plant construction opened the door to the possibility of anticipating the increments
of capacity required to meet future demand levels, and exploiting thereby the
resulting economies of scale. In this context, it was reasonable to assume that
demand expansion was pushed exogenously by the population growth.
Today, in developed countries, similar demand booms are still observed in
several industries, but for other reasons than an exogenous population growth.
These booms now often follow from the globalisation of trade: while markets in
developed countries expanded initially around local or national demands, they
are now progressively concerned by larger and larger geographical areas. In some
sense, ﬁrms operating in these industries are faced today in developed countries
with a problem akin to the problem met by governments in developing countries in
the past: they also expect progressive expansion of demand consecutive to trade
globalisation,while beneﬁting as well from economies of scale in plant construc-
tion. However, in this new context, it is not reasonable to view demand increases
addressed to ﬁrms operating in such industries as exogenous. These ﬁrms are no47
longer public institutions, as in the original situation, but rather proﬁt maximiz-
ing institutions. As such, they beneﬁtf r o ms p e c i ﬁc instruments which were not
at the disposal of the governments. In particular, they can now accompany their
investment policy by a price policy through which they can manipulate the levels
of demand through time.
In order to capture this new strategic possibility, we study in the present
paper a similar plant size problem as in Chenery (1952) and Manne (1961). Yet
w en o wa l l o wt h ep r o ﬁt-maximising ﬁrm producing the good to combine its invest-
ment policy with a product price policy adjusting demand upwards, or downwards,
over time. This extension has to cope with the diﬃculty that, even if the volume
demanded is exogenously increasing (or decreasing) at each price over time, the
ﬁrm can now decrease or increase it by instantaneous increases or decreases in the
price pattern. We characterize the optimal price and investment policies of the
monopolist under the assumption that the ﬁrm while controlling the size of the
investments to be undertaken, does not control the dates, which are assumed to
be equally spaced through time, at which these investments have to be consented.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. The optimal price policy, through which the monopo-
list can possibly dampen or enhance the expansion of demand through time, leads
to an investment pattern with increments of capacity which are either constant
over time at each investment date, or start to become constant after a ﬁnite set
of investment dates. Furthermore, the optimal price pattern between two dates at
which new capacity is installed falls into two categories: either the price pattern
is such that total existing capacity is fully used at each instant between thesedates; or the instantaneous monopoly price is used for some period within the
cycle and, thereafter, until the end of the cycle, the price which dampens instanta-
neous demand at the level of installed capacity is adopted. Finally, we show that
the optimal constant increment of capacity is smaller than the one which would
have been selected by a planner facing a demand growing exogenously at a rate
corresponding to the instantaneous monopoly price, as in Manne (1961). These
conclusions are ap r i o r ifar from being evident. Even constrained to invest at
equally spaced dates, the monopolist could have as well preferred to manipulate
the price, according to the value of the interest rate, in order to decrease or in-
crease the size of the investments through time rather than using a constant—cycle
investment size p olicy .
Research on the plant-size problem has been pursued without discontinuity
since the sixties. Manne (1961) and (1967) faced the capacity expansion problem
which was met by several manufacturing facilities in India. Assuming an exogenous
demand growing linearly over time and economies of scale in investment costs, he
ﬁnds that the optimal investment policy is constant-cycle : successive investments
are all of the same size and undertaken at equally spaced points of time. These
ﬁndings have been extended afterwards in several directions. Srinivasan (1967)
proves that the constant-cycle property of the optimal plan extends to the case
where demand is growing geometrically over time. Gabszewicz and Vial (1972)
extend the analysis to exogenous technological progress which can arise either
at a deterministic date or at a random time in the future. In both cases, the
constant-cycle property of the optimal policy still holds. Around the same period49
a considerable amount of research work has been devoted to the problems of lead
times and uncertain demand (see in particular Nickell (1977), Freidenfelds (1981),
Bean and al. (1992), Chaouch and Buzacott (1994) and Ryan (2002)).
Although these research contributions represent important advances in the
understanding of the plant-size problem, they all assume that demand for capacity
increases is exogenously given, and cannot be adjusted through some price policy.
Of course, this assumption was a natural entry point since past contributions
were mainly concerned with ﬁnding the solution of a planning problem met in
the framework of a country development program, and not with identifying the
solution of a proﬁt-maximiser monopolist. Nevertheless, as shown in the present
paper, the plant-size problem can be reformulated in order to take into account
this market alternative interpretation, in which the ﬁrm is allowed to manipulate
instantaneous demand through price. So, departing from the above research lines,
we propose to relax the assumption of exogenous demand increase. We replace it by
an assumption about the time expansion of a price-quantity relation specifying how
instantaneous demand varies with price at each point of time. More precisely, we
suppose that, at each point of time, market demand is given by a linear function of
instantaneous price, the intercept of which increases linearly with time. Moreover,
we make the assumption alluded above concerning the size of the investments,
namely, we ﬁx a sequence of equally spaced points of time at which the investments
for adding capacity may be undertaken and characterise the optimal policy of the
monopolist in terms of his instruments: price regime and investment’s size.The model is described in section 2. In the same section, we fully characterise
both the optimal price and investment policies .We summarize our ﬁndings in the
conclusion and propose some paths for further research.
2.2 The analysis of the optimal policy
2.2.1 The model
We consider a monopolist facing a demand function D(t,p) deﬁned by
D(t,p)=At − p
with t denoting continuous time and p instantaneous price: demand at each price is
accordingly expanding through time because the intercept of the demand function
increases at a rate proportional to t. At each instant of time t, the capacity of
the ﬁrm is bounded by the existing amount of equipment, which we denote by
X(t). While the existing capacity may exceed the current demand level D(t,p), no
undercapacity is admitted, so that D(t,p) ≤ X(t). The investment cost for adding
new capacity x, which includes both ﬁxed cost k, k > 0, and variable cost ax,
exhibits economies of scale, namely
f(x)=k + ax;
This cost structure is assumed to hold for ever (no technological progress). Also
we assume no capital depreciation. Time is discounted at a constant interest rate
r. The time horizon is unbounded.51
Now we assume that the monopolist is allowed to make investment decisions
xti at ﬁxed equally spaced points of time ti, i =0 ,1,2,... In the interval [ti,t i+1[,the
existing capacity remains constant and is equal to X(ti)=
P
k:tk≤ti xtk. At each
ti, the ﬁrm decides the increment of capacity xti to be installed and sets the price
p(t) for t ∈ [ti,t i+1[. Then at time ti+1 a new investment is undertaken and a new
p r i c es c h e d u l ef o rt h ep e r i o di sd e ﬁned, and so on. Up to a change of units we set
ti = i. The interval of time [i,i+1[between two dates at which a new investment
i sd e c i d e di sc a l l e dacycle.
Formally, given the sequence of investment dates {i},i=0 ,1,2,3...,the
problem of identifying the optimal policy for the monopolist consists in ﬁnding
x =( x0;x1;....xi...) ∈ R∞
+ and p(t) ,m e a s u r a b l ef u n c t i o no ft ∈ R+ so that the








is maximized, subject to the capacity constraint
D(t,p(t)) ≤ X(t).
The deﬁnition of optimality decomposes into two components. The ﬁrst refers
to the properties of the optimal price pattern trough time while the second concerns
the optimal sequence of capacity increments required in order to meet demand at
each instant of time.
2.2.2 The optimal price policy within a cycleIn order to ﬁnd the optimal price solution we ﬁr s tr e m a r kt h a tt h ec o s t
function
P∞
i=0 (k + axi) does not depend on the choice of p(t). Accordingly, a
suﬃcient condition for the optimality of p(t) is that it maximizes the integrand
p(t)D(t;p(t)) at any point t, given the capacity constraint.
Then we observe that, if the investment size decision x is kept ﬁxed from one









s.t. D(t;p(t)) ≤ Xi,i=[ t].
During the cycle [i,i +1 [, there are two possible price regimes depending on
the capacity level compared with the demand level. Assume that at some date t,
i ≤ t<i +1, the capacity constraint is not binding, namely D(t;p(t)) <X i. Then,
at the optimal policy, p(t) should be set equal to the maximizing price pM(t)=At
2
as the demand does not need to be dampened. Yet, the demand expands over
time while the current capacity remains ﬁxed. When it happens that the capacity
constraint turns out to be binding, namely D(t;p(t)) = Xi, then the ﬁrm has to
choose the price pC(t)=At − Xi so as to contract the demand D(t;p(t)) within
the limits imposed by its plant size. These two price patterns pM(t) and pC(t)
are called, respectively, monopoly price regime and constrained price regime, and
the resulting demand patterns are denoted by DM (t) and DC (t), respectively.53
Further, we denote by t∗
i the point of time when the monopolist switches from the
monopoly price regime into the constrained regime (namely when pM(t) becomes
equal to pC(t)); we label this point as the switching point t∗
i. It is easy to see
that t∗
i = 2Xi
A . Then, four scenarios may arise. Assume ﬁrst that the switching
point lies after i +1or that it is exactly equal to i +1 ; then the optimal price
pattern coincides with the monopoly price regime during the whole cycle (scenarios
A and B respectively). Assume now that the switching point lies between the two
investment dates of a cycle [i,i +1 [ ; then both these two regimes are used at the
optimal price pattern, the ﬁrst one between i and t∗
i and the second between t∗
i
and i+1(scenario C). Assume now that the switching point lies before i; then the
monopolist is forced to use the constrained price regime during the whole cycle
in order to meet the capacity constraint (scenario D). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
these 4 scenarios.
It is easy to see that this switching point t∗
i can never exceed the point
i+1:i nt h i sc a s e ,i tw o u l db es u ﬃcient to reduce the installed capacity up to the
point where this capacity is equal to DM ¡
i +1 ,p M(i +1 )
¢
, say by ε, in order to
gain the discounted costs εa
¡
e−ri − e−r(i+1)¢
without incurring any reduction of
revenue. So the ﬁrst scenario never arises. We prove now that the switching point
t∗
i can never be exactly equal to the regeneration point i +1 , excluding thereby
also scenario B.Figure 1: The switching point t∗
i lies either exceeds (scenario A) or coincides with
the point of time i +1(scenario B).
Lemma 7 During any cycle i, the switching point t∗
i belongs either to the interior
of the cycle i, or it is strictly smaller than i.
Proof. Assume that, for some i, X
0
i would be the optimal installed capacity
at date i and that X
0
i = DM (i +1 ). Then the monopolist can use the monopoly
regime pM
i (t) during the whole cycle. The present value of the discounted ﬂow of









Now assume that the installed capacity X
0
i drops by a small quantity ε, so that X
0
i−
ε<D M (i +1 )with 0 <ε<1. The monopolist gains the discounted cost saved by
reducing the investment by ε,namely εa
¡
e−ri − e−r(i+1)¢
. Yet, the demand is not
completely met. This induces to switch from the monopoly price regime pM
i to the
constrained price pC
i .T h u s ,t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h ed i s c o u n t e dﬂow of revenues55




















(i +1− δ)(t − (i +1− δ))
#
e−rtdt,
where δ = Aε
2 and t he second term corresp onds to the revenue stemming from
the use of the c onstrained regi me b e tweeni +1−δ andi +1. S ubs tracti ng (18)


















(i +1− δ)(t − (i +1− δ))
#
e−rtdt.
The loss L is of third order in ε, as it is given by the integral of a function of
the order of δ




ﬁrst order in ε. Accordingly, for ε small enough, the net loss should be negative,
which is the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
We deduce immediately from the above that only the two remaining scenarios
can be observed at an optimal price policy. Thus, the optimal price pattern within
a cycle must either consist of quoting always the instantaneous constrained price,
or using ﬁrst this price and then, after the switching point, the constrained regime.
The ﬁrst alternative should necessarily hold when the investment at time i is so





time.Figure 2: The switching point lies either between i and i+1(scenario C) or before
the point of time i +1(scenario D).
The second one corresponds to a situation where the capacity installed at time
i is large enough to serve the monopoly demand for some period in the beginning
of cycle i, so that the switching point is interior to the cycle. Accordingly , the
nature of the optimal price policy within a cycle is directly related to the size of
the investment consented at the beginning of the cycle.
2.2.3 The Optimal Investment Policy
Thus, it remains to identify the optimal sequence of investments in order to
fully characterize the optimal policy. Clearly, the optimal policy must depend
on the main parameters of the model, namely, the interest rate r, the intercepts
At of the demand functions and the unit variable cost a. When the unit vari-
able investment cost a is high compared with the growth parameter of demand
A, then the revenue derived from deciding a non-negative increment of capac-
ity at date i may well not compensate the increase in investment cost that it57
entails: in that case, no increment of capacity is consented at the beginning of
the cycle so that only the constrained price regime can be adopted within the
rest of the cycle, as in ﬁgure 2 D. However, as we shall see in the following, this
scenario cannot last forever at the optimal investment policy: after a while the
increase in demand makes proﬁtable a positive increment of capacity and both
the price regimes are then alternated. On the contrary, when the unit variable
investment cost a is low compared with the growth parameter of demand A, then
the revenue derived from deciding a strictly positive increment of capacity at
date i compensates the increase in investment cost that it entails: then at opti-
mum, the price policy alternates instantaneous monopoly and constrained prices,
as in ﬁgure 2 C. In this case, we prove below that this optimal price policy re-
mains identical in each cycle for ever. The two above cases displayed in ﬁgure
2C and 2D, and the ensuing optimal investment policies, are now considered suc-
cessively. Let us remark the following which will be used in the proof of the
next propositions. Consider an optimal x∗ and denote by V (x)i,h the value of
the objective function at the vector (x)i,h =( x0,...,xi − h,...xi + h,...,xi+1...) for
any i and h ≤ xi. Clearly it follows from the optimality property of x∗ that
V (x∗) > V (x)i,h for (x)i,h =( x0,...,xi − h,...xi + h,...,xi+1...) for any i and
h ≤ xi. Then d
dhV (x)i,h =0 ,i=0 ,1,2, namely the marginal revenue and the
marginal costs derived from decreasing by h the capacity installed at time i and
increasing by the same amount the one installed at time i+1counterbalance ecah
other, for any cycle [i,i +1 [ .







(19)on the parameters . It is e asy to see that condition (19) can only hol d f or a
ﬁnite number of cycles [i,i +1 [ . Let i0 be the ﬁrst cycle at which this inequality
is reversed. We have
Proposition 8 When (19) holds, the optimal policy consists, up to the cycle
[i0 − 1,i 0[, in zero increments of capacity and for i ≥ i0 in a constant incre-
ment of capacity at each cycle. Moreover, the optimal price policy displays ﬁrst a
constrained price regime within the whole cycle, adjusted in each cycle, and then
a monopoly and a constrained price regime within each cycle.
Proof. We consider here the case when the switching point t∗
i is outside of
the interior of the cycle [i,i+1[. Then it is on the left of i (see ﬁgure 2 D), and the
installed capacity is not suﬃcient to meet the instantaneous monopoly demand at
i. The constrained price regime only applies. For the F.O.C. to be satisﬁed at the
optimal solution x∗
i for any i, the marginal revenue must be equal to its marginal
costs, within any cycle [i,i +1 [ . Then, the following holds:
i+1 Z
i
(At − 2Xi)e−rtdt = ae−ri(1 − e−r)
with Xi = Xi−1 + λi. Then, the above condition can be re-expressed as follows
1 Z
0




where s = t − i and λi is the solution of (20) which does not depend on i. Then,
x∗




i > i0,x ∗
i > 0




the cost a(1−e−r) resulting from a non-negative investment size exactly counter-
balance each other. So, as x∗
i =0the constrained price regime is operated till i0.
Furthermore, when x∗
i > 0 the constrained price regime tends to decrease from
cycle to cycle as the investment for adding capacity increases. At the time point
when the plant size is so big as to satisfy the demand growing linearly over time,
the constrained price regime is replaced by the monopolistic price regime and then
we fall in the case when both price regimes apply forever. Q.E.D.
Notice that even if (19) holds, in the long run the optimal investment policy is
constant cycle and the optimal price policy always consists in alternating monopoly
price and constrained price regimes within a cycle. By contrast, as stated in the
next proposition the same optimal policies turn out to be observed from the very
beginning when the reverse of (19) holds.
Proposition 9 When the reverse of (19) holds, the investment optimal policy is
unique and stationary through all cycles.
Proof. F i r s tn o t i c et h a tt h es w i t c h i n gp o i n tt∗
i exists and it is unique for
each cycle [i,i +1 [ . Accordingly, if we prove that the optimal investment policy
is constant cycle, the optimal price policy repeats identically from a cycle to theother. Consider a speciﬁcc y c l e[i,i+1[and assume that the switching point t∗
i is











i − i))e−rsds = ae−ri(1 − e−r) (21)
where it is still s = t − i. Then (21) can be rewritten
f(t∗






is a function that does not depend on i. It is
immediate to see that t∗
i = i + ¯ l where ¯ l i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt of(l)=a.
Then, given the time i when the increment of capacity is installed, t∗
i is univocally
determined by ¯ l, which does not depend on i, for any i. Finally, as t∗
i identiﬁes
the level of available capacity Xi in any cycle [i,i +1 [ , the solution is stationary,
as claimed. Q.E.D.
A simple byproduct of the above results is that the optimal constant incre-
ment of capacity is smaller than the one which would have been selected by a
planner facing a demand growing exogenously at a rate corresponding to the in-
stantaneous monopoly price. If the monopolist would quote at each instant of time
the monopoly price, it would generate a linear demand trajectory with slope A
2 in
the demand-time space (see ﬁgure 3). We can ﬁnd out what is the optimal solu-61
tion of the planning problem corresponding to this expansion of demand, viewed
as in Manne (1961). To this solution, there corresponds an optimal constant cycle
in investment and, accordingly, a sequence of equally-spaced dates (regeneration
points in the language of Manne) at which this constant increment of capacity
is consented. Starting with this sequence of cycles, we can wonder whether the
constant-cycle optimal investment policy of the monopolist leads at the begin-
ning of each cycle to a capacity increment which is larger or smaller than the one
resulting from the planning solution provided by Manne.
Proposition 10 The optimal constant increment of capacity chosen by the mo-
nopolist is smaller than the one which would have been selected by a planner facing
demand levels D
¡
i +1 ,p M (i +1 )
¢
growing exogenously at a rate corresponding to
the instantaneous monopoly price.
Proof. The demand levels resulting from the use of the monopoly price
within the whole cycle, for each cycle, correspond to the price policy in scenario
A. In lemma 1, it is shown that this cannot be a price policy corresponding to
the optimal pattern selected by the monopolist. Similarly, we have seen that an
optimal increment of capacity decided at i cannot strictly exceed the demand level
DM ¡
i +1 ,p M(i +1 )
¢
. Consequently, the optimal increment of capacity must be
strictly smaller than DM ¡
i +1 ,p M(i +1 )
¢
while, at the Manne solution, it is
exactly equal to this magnitude. Q.E.D.
Thus , wheth er prop osition 8 or 9 ap plies d ep ends on cond ition (1 9) ,which
itself depends on the values of parameters A, a and r. Assume that, at i =1 ,
condi tion (1 9) holds. Then we know that prop osition 8 applies: at the b eginning,Figure 3: Demand levels corresponding to the monopoly price regime.63
for low values of i, no increment of capacity is proﬁtable. However, as the demand
function increases over time, at cycle i0, the increment of capacity starts to be
p ositive and we e nter in the scenario describ e d i n p rop osition 9. Notice that,
ceteris paribus, condition (19) cannot hold for high values of the demand growth
rate A. The reason is that, whatever the cost of investing, as expressed by the
unit variable cost a and the interest rate r ,as u ﬃciently large value of A should
necessarily reverse the inequality (19).A s s u m e n o w t h a t , a t i =0 , the reverse
of condition (19) holds. Then, from the very beginning, a positive increment of
capacity is bui lt, and prop osi tion 9 applies. In the pro of of thi s prop osition, we
have deﬁned the function f(l) through which the switching point t∗
i of any cycle
[i,i +1 [corresponding to the optimal policy is derived as
f(t∗
i − i)=a
with f(l) deﬁned by (22)
Now consider ﬁgure 4 where the function f(l) is depicted.
Then, the switching point t∗
i obtained as i + ¯ l, as deﬁned in the proof of
proposition 3, is easily identiﬁed through ﬁgure 4. Moreover, it is immediate that,
ceteris paribus, when the unit variable cost a increases, the value of ¯ l decreases;
this entails a reduction in the value of the switching point and, accordingly, in
the size of the optimal increment of capacity. Notice that when A increases, the
whole function f(l) shifts upwards displacing the point ¯ l to the right. Thus the
switching point moves to the right, entailing an increase in the optimal capacity
installed at time i. Finally, when the interest rate r increases, it is easy to see that
¯ l moves to the left, reﬂecting thereby the increase in investment cost, and entailingthe ensuing reduction of installed capacity at the optimum.
2.3 Conclusion
The plant size problem introduced in the ﬁfties was designed in order to solve
planning problems raised by an exogenous expansion of demand due to the de-
mographic trend in developing countries. In this paper we have considered an
alternative version of the plant size problem, now formulated in the context of
a market environment. A monopolist, facing demand expansion and increasing
returns, has the opportunity to combine his investment policy with a price pol-
icy aiming at manipulating the instantaneous price in order to dampen demand
whenever the existing capacity is in a bottleneck. We have characterised both the
optimal policies under the assumption that increments of capacity can take place
at the beginning of each cycle of a sequence of equally-spaced cycles.
This analysis calls for several generalizations. First, it would be interesting to
relax the assumption according to which decision points are ﬁxed, and to analyze
the reverse problem, namely, the one when the investment size is ﬁxed and the
optimal plan is deﬁn e do nt h eb a s i so fb o t hp r i c er e g i m e sa n di n v e s t m e n tt i m i n g
(see footnote 1). Although this would change the frame, yet it would probably not
change the main properties of the model. The stationarity property of investment
plans involving two price regimes should still hold. Second, it would be natural to
introduce other dynamic elements which could inﬂuence the optimal time trajec-
tories of prices and investments, like obsolescence (see d’Aspremont et alii (1972))
or technical progress, as in Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). Finally, the extension
of the model to a dynamic game with two oligopolists would enrich the market65
Figure 4: f(l) does not depend on i.environment in which it could be applied. A natural question in this extended
framework would then be: is a similar cyclical behaviour reproduced at the Nash
equilibrium of the resulting game? In the longer run, the prospective analysis
could even be more ambitious. Since the main outcome of the present paper is to
stress the optimal property of successive periods of capacity expansion followed by
periods of no investment and contained demand, perhaps a similar model could be
used to explain, at least partially, the existence of business cycles (See in particular













(i +1− δ)(t − (i +1− δ))
¸
e−rtdt de-
notes the discounted ﬂow of revenues stemming from the use of the constrained




((At − Xi)Xi)e−rtdt (23)
be the be the discounted revenue when the monopolist uses the constrained regime
within the period [i +1− δ,1+1 [ . Also, we know that Xi =
A(i+1−δ)
2 . Then by

























(i +1− δ)(t − (i +1− δ))
#
e−rtdt.
2.4.2 Appendix BAs stated in prop osition 8 and prop osition 9, the optimal i nve stment p olicy
can display two diﬀerent price patterns: either at the beginning of a cycle [i,i+1[
the monopoly price regime is adopted and then from the switching point t∗
i up to
t h ee n do ft h ec y c l et h ec o n s t r a i n e dp r i c er egime is quoted, or the constrained price
regime applies for the whole cycle. Namely when the optimal increment of capacity
x∗
i installed at time i suﬃces to meet levels of demand within the interval[i,t∗
i],t h e
ﬁrm charges both the price regimes, otherwise the constrained regime only arises.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the ﬁrst cycle [0,1[ when the plant has
still to be initiated. Then, for an initial investment to be non-negative at the
optimal solution, the marginal revenue stemming from a non-negative investment
must be equal to the marginal cost of installing this capacity, namely:
1 Z
0
Ate−rtdt = a(1 − e−r)



















the monopolist refrains from investing, namely x∗ =0 , and constrained regime
only applies; whereas when the cost of investing is low with respect to the gain of









then both the regimes apply. Finally, when the growth of demand and investment









the ﬁrm starts to undertake a non-null investment and the price policy tends to
decompose in both the price regimes.71
CHAPTER 3.




We consider a monopoly producing a good whose intercept of its demand
function grows linearly over time: at each price demand expands through time
as the intercept of the demand function grows. Whatever the price policy that
is adopted, the monopolist invests in order to meet the resulting demand growth.
The monopolist can only invest in indivisible factory units. We identify the opti-
mal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence of investment time points the
monopoly selects through time. We show that this sequence satisﬁes the constant
cycle property observed under capacity expansion for an exogenous increase in
demand (Manne, 1961).3.1 Introduction
Adding facilities to optimally meet rising demand for these facilities is one
of the most debated issue in all the industries which are characterized by trade-
oﬀs in decision making process due to economies of scale in investment costs or
commitment of substantial resources for further capacity. Typical examples are
given by heavy process industries, communication network, and water resources
systems. Research on this topic have been pursued since the sixties in the context
of developing countries where explosive demographics forced the governments to
regularly increase capacity over time, in order to face increases in demand result-
ing from such populations’ booms. Manne (1961 and 1967) examined the capacity
expansion problem which was met by several manufacturing facilities in India. As-
suming an exogenous demand growing linearly over time and economies of scale
in investment costs, he found that the optimal investment policy is constant-cycle:
successive investments are all of the same size and undertaken at equally spaced
points of time. These ﬁndings were extended in several directions. Srinivasan
(1967) proved that the constant-cycle property of the optimal plan extends to the
case where demand is growing geometrically over time. D’Aspremont Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972) embedded into the analysis the assumption of an exogenous de-
preciation rate, while Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) introduced the technological
progress which can arise either at a deterministic date or at a random time in the
f u t u r e .I nb o t hc a s e s ,t h ec o n s t a n t - c y c l eproperty of the optimal policy still holds.
A considerable amount of studies has been developed afterwards mainly in the
operation research ﬁeld, and variants of the capacity expansion model as it was73
formulated by Manne (1961) were used for several application to public services
(see Luss 1982, Li and Tirupati 1992, and Nam and Logendran 1992 for a survey
of the capacity expansion problem in OR and its main applications).
While in the context of developing countries, it was reasonable to assume that
demand expansion was pushed exogenously by the population growth, today sim-
ilar demand booms are observed for other reasons than an exogenous population
growth. Indeed, they mainly derive from the globalisation of trade which makes
industries progressively concerned with larger and larger geographical areas to be
served.
Further, mainly in response to the failure of state-owned entities to meet the
growing needs of customers, many public utilities have been progressively changed
into private institutions, namely proﬁt maximizing entities. As such, they are
a l l o w e dt ou s ea c c o r d i n gt oap r o ﬁt-maximization criterion speciﬁci n s t r u m e n t s
which were not available at the time when public utilities were required to satisfy
the demand function, e.g. they can adopt a price policy in order to manipulate
the demand function over time consistently with their installed capacity .
Accordingly, we propose to relax the assumption of exogenous demand in-
crease and replace it by an assumption about the time expansion of a demand
function specifying how instantaneous demand varies with price at each point of
time. More precisely, we consider a monopoly producing a good whose intercept
of its demand function grows linearly over time: at each price demand expands
through time as the intercept of the demand function grows. Whatever the price
that is quoted at each instant, the monopolist must invest in order to meet theresulting demand growth. Further, the monopolist can only invest in indivisible
factory units. The problem we would like to study in this paper is the following.
What is the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence of investment
time points the monopolist should select through time ? Of course, the answer to
this question would be simple if the price selected by the monopolist would be
kept constant over time. Indeed, in this case, the investment points would be fully
determined by the length of the time-interval during which the capacity of the last
installed factory is suﬃcient to face the demand increase at that price. Since the
capacity of each factory is assumed to be constant, this in turn would imply that
the investment points are equally spaced. Yet, the problem is no longer as simple
if we consider at the same time the possibility opened to the monopolist to manip-
ulate the price over time. In that case, he can either dampen demand increases by
increasing the price trajectory or, on the contrary, beneﬁt from full instantaneous
monopoly proﬁt by adapting simply the monopoly price to demand increase. Of
course, these price manipulations will no longer keep necessarily the time interval
between two investment points constant. For instance, if demand is dampened by
a strongly increasing price trajectory after a given investment point of time, the
next investment will have to be undertaken earlier than for a weaker price increase.
Here, we characterise the optimal policy to be followed when the monopolist can
manipulate the price trajectory and the resulting sequence of investment points
under the constraint of meeting demand at each point of time. Our ﬁndings are
as follows. The optimal price policy, through which the monopolist can possibly
dampen or enhance the expansion of demand through time, leads to a sequence of
time points when to install a new factory which are equally spaced. Furthermore,
the optimal price pattern between two dates at which a new factory is installed75
falls into two categories: either the price pattern is such that total existing capac-
ity which results from the number of installed factories is fully used at each instant
between these dates; or the instantaneous monopoly price is used for some period
within these dates and, thereafter, until the point of time when a new factory is
installed, the price which dampens instantaneous demand at the level of installed
factory is adopted. Finally, we show that the time between the points when new
factories are installed is longer than the one which would have been selected by a
planner facing demand levels corresponding to the instantaneous monopoly price,
as in Manne (1961).
The model is described in section 2. In the same section, we fully characterise
both the optimal price and investment policies. Then, we show how our model is
related to other bulks of literature. We summarize our ﬁndings in the conclusion
and propose some paths for further research.
3.2 Basic framework
We consider a monopolist facing a demand function D(t,p) increasing over
time deﬁned as follows:
D(t,p)=At − p
where t denotes continuous time and p instantaneous price. At each price demand
expands through time as the intercept of the demand function A grows propor-tionally to t.
The sequence of capacity increments xti consists of a new factory whose size
is constant and equal to ¯ x. Then, at each instant of time t, the available capacity
X(t) is bounded by the existing number of installed factories i¯ xti,w h e r ei denotes
the numb er of f actories wh ich have b een i nstalled u p t o t he timet. While the
existing capacity may exceed the current demand level D(t,p), no undercapacity
is admitted, so that D(t,p) ≤ X(t). The investment cost for adding a new factory
of size ¯ x is equal to:
f(x)=a¯ x;
This cost structu re is assumed t o h old f or ever (no t echnological progress). Also
we assume no capital depreciation. Time is discounted at a constant interest rate
r. The time horizon is unbounded. We assume that (i) the sequence of capacity
increments xti consists of a constant investment size ¯ x ; (ii) the monopolist sets
the price regime p(t) for t ∈ [ti,t i+1[ ,a n da n yp e r i o d[ti,t i+1[ and, accordingly,
selects the timing of investment {ti},t i =0 ,1,2...when to install the exogenously
given capacity ¯ x. The dates selected by the monopolist in order to install new
factories are called regeneration points, and the interval of time [ti,t i+1[ between
two regeneration points is called cycle. In each cycle [ti,t i+1[ the existing capacity
remains constant and is equal to X(ti)=
P
k:tk≤ti xtk = i¯ x. In the usual plant
size problem, an exogenous sequence of capacity increments would automatically
determine the corresponding sequence of regeneration points. Yet, when the mo-
nopolist can manipulate the price through time, this correspondence ceases to
operate since it depends on the price policy selected by her. A price policy is a
function p(t) which speciﬁes the price announced by the monopolist at each instant77
t. Given any price policy, we may associate to it a sequence of regeneration points
(t1;t2;....ti...)=t(p(t)). Formally the problem is to ﬁnd p(t) and, accordingly








is maximized subject to the capacity constraint
D(t,p(t)) ≤ X(t).
A policy is said to be optimal when it consists in an optimal price pattern through
time and, as a consequence, an optimal sequence of dates when to install capacity
in order to satisfy demand at each instant of time.
3.3 The Optimal Policy
In this section we start by considering the optimal price policy within a cycle.
In order to ﬁnd the optimal price pattern within a cycle we ﬁrst remark that the
cost function
P∞
ti=0 a¯ xtie−rti, where the t0
is correspond to that policy, does not
depend on the choice of p(t) . Then, a suﬃcient condition for the optimality of
p(t) is that it maximizes the integrand p(t)D(t;p(t)) at any point t,g i v e nt h e
capacity constraint.
Notice that within any cycle [ti,t i+1[, the objective function V (t,p(t))
achieves its maximum for p(t) given byp(t) = max(At/2,At− Xti)





s.t.D(t;p(t)) ≤ Xti,t i =[ t].
Whatever the selected sequence of regeneration points, during the cycle
[ti,t i+1[ , they may arise two price regimes, depending on the size of the fac-
tory ¯ x with respect to the demand. Assume that at some point of time t, where
ti ≤ t<t i+1, the capacity constraint is not binding, namely D(t;p(t)) <X ti.
Then, at the optimal policy, p(t) should be set equal to the maximizing price
pM(t)=At
2 , as the demand does not need to be dampened. Yet, the demand ex-
pands over time while the current capacity remains ﬁxed during the cycle [ti,t i+1[.
When it happens that the capacity constraint turns out to be binding, namely
D(t;p(t)) = Xti, then the ﬁrm has to choose the price pC(t)=At − Xti so as to
contract the demand D(t;p(t)) within the limits imposed by the existing factories.
These two price patterns pM(t) and pC(t) are called, respectively, monopoly price
regime and constrained price regime. Further, we denote by t∗
i the point of time
when the monopoly price regime pM(t) becomes equal to the constrained price
regime pC(t)) and we label this point as the switching point t∗




A . Then, th ree s cenarios may aris e  .Intheﬁrst s cenari o t he switch-
ing point is exactly equal to ti+1, so the optimal price pattern coincides with the
monopoly price regime during the whole of the cycle (scenario A). In the second
scenario , the switching point lies between the two investment dates of a cycle79
[ti,t i+1[; then both these two regimes are used at the optimal price pattern, the
ﬁrst one between ti and t∗
i and the second between t∗
i and ti+1 (scenario B). In the
third scenario the switching point lies before ti; then the monopolist is forced to
use the constrained price regime during the whole of the cycle in order to meet the
capacity constraint (scenario C). Figures 5 illustrate these 3 scenarios. We prove
ﬁr s tt h a tt h es w i t c h i n gp o i n tt∗
i can never be exactly equal to the regeneration
point ti+1, excluding thereby scenario A.
Proposition 11 During any cycle [ti,t i+1[ the switching point t∗
i belongs either
to the interior of the cycle ti,o ri ti ss t r i c t l ys m a l l e rt h a nti.









Then, the monopolist can quote the monopoly price regime during the whole of
the cycle because the time length between ti and t
0
i+1 is the one at which the









. T h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h ed i s c o u n t e dﬂow of revenues R during the















i. The ﬁrm gains the discounted cost G = a¯ xti(e−rti+1− e−r(ti+1+δ)) saved by
postponing the investment. Yet, the demand is not completely satisﬁed. This
induces to switch from the monopoly price regime pM
ti to the constrained price
regime pC
ti. Accordingly, the present value of the discounted ﬂow of revenues Ri
during the cycle [ti,t
0

































where the second integral denotes the revenue stemming from using the constrained




i+1 +δ. Substracting (25) from (24) yields the loss



































This loss L is a function of the order of δ
2 over an interval of length δ, so its
order is of magnitude δ
3, while the gain G is of ﬁrst order in δ. Accordingly, for δ
small enough the net loss is negative. Then if the investment in new factory would
be postponed postpone, the corresponding discounted proﬁt would increase, which
is the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
It follows from above that only two scenarios may be observed at the optimal
price policy within a cycle: either (i) the level of demand at some t ≥ ti can
be satisﬁed by the existing equipment Xti, for any ti, then the optimal price
policy consists in quoting between the regeneration point ti and the switching
point t∗
i the monopoly price regime and, after the switching point up to the next
regeneration point ti+1, the constrained price regime; or (ii) the level of demand at
ti cannot be met by the existing equipment and then the constrained price regime
is quoted within the whole of the cycle. Whether the monopoly price regime and81
the constrained price regime alternate within a cycle, or the constrained regime
applies during the whole of the cycle, depends on the exogenous size of the factory
¯ x which is installed at the beginning of each cycle, and gain and costs resulting from
investing at a certain date. If the the size of the new factory which is consented
to be installed is large, the switching point t∗
i may result beyond the investment
date ti, and the optimal price policy involves the monopoly price regime between
ti and t∗
i, and the constrained regime from t∗
i up to ti+1 ( F i g u r e6 ;c a s e( i ) ).O n
t h ec o n t r a r y ,i ft h es i z eo ft h ef a c t o r y¯ x is small, the optimal investment date ti
may result beyond the switching point t∗
i, and the optimal price policy results in
quoting the constrained regime within the whole of the cycle (Figure 7; case (ii)).
Denote by x0 the ”ﬁctitious” factory size such that x0 = D(p(0)) ,a n dti =
t∗
i. The following holds :
Lemma 12 When ¯ xti >x 0, then t∗
i >t i and the optimal price policy consists in
quoting both the price regimes within the cycle [ti,t i+1[ ,w h i l ef o r¯ xti <x 0,t ∗
i <
ti and the constrained regime applies during the whole of the cycle.
We prove now that both in the case when ¯ x>x 0, a n di nt h er e v e r s eo n e ,t h e
optimal investment time policy is unique and stationary. However, according to
the above lemma, the corresponding optimal price policies diﬀer in both cases.
Let us ﬁrst remark the following, which will be used in the proof of the next












t∗ e−rtXti(At − Xti)dt. Clearly the
sequence of investment dates ti
0s corresponding to the optimal price regimes mustmaximizes V (t). This can be satisﬁed only when the cost a¯ xti and the revenue
R ti+1
ti π(t)e−rtdt of installing a new factory exactly countervail.
We start now with the ﬁrst case, and consider the case when ¯ x>x 0.
Proposition 13 In the case when the constant factory size ¯ x =¯ xti exceeds the
value of x0 for which ti = t∗
i, the optimal price policy involves both the monopoly
and constrained price regimes ; furthermore, the resulting sequence of regeneration
points is stationary.
Proof. First, notice that the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately
from the ﬁrst part of the lemma. Consider a speciﬁcc y c l e[ti,t i+1[ and assume
that the ﬁrm invests in a new factory at time ti + δ instead of time ti. Then, the
cycle [ti−1,t i[ grows longer by δ,w h i l et h ec y c l e[ti,t i+1[ turns into [ti + δ,ti+1[.
Thus, the change in the revenue function R due to prolonging the cycle [ti−1,t i[



















4 is the equation of a parabola representing the revenue function if the factory
xti is installed at time ti, while A2
4 [2t∗
i−1t − (t∗
i−1)2] is the equation of a straight
line denoting the revenue function if the new factory is installed at time ti +δ and
the constrained price regime is quoted from the switching point t∗
i−1 up to the end
of the cycle.
The diﬀerence in the cost function C is
∆C = a¯ xti(e−rti − e−r(ti+δ)) ∼ δa¯ xtie−rti83
up to terms quadratic in δ. Then the net change writes as the diﬀerence between
the change in cost function and the change in the revenue function, namely:





It is easy to see that given xti, there is a unique ti such that the net change
c a n c e l so u t .A st h i sv a l u eo fti only depends on the parameters of the model and
the exogenous increment of capacity and all of them are constant over time, then
the optimal policy is unique and stationary. Q.E.D.
We consider now the second case, namely when ¯ x ≤ x0 and the switching
point t∗
i is out of the cycle [ti,t i+1[, that is t∗
i <t i, and we prove that even in this
case the investment time policy which is induced by the price policy is unique and
stationary.
Proposition 14 In the case when the constant factory size ¯ x =¯ xti is smaller
than the value of x0 for which ti = t∗
i,the optimal price policy involves the con-
s t r a i n e dp r i c er e g i m eo n l y ;f u r t h e r m o r e ,t h er e s u l t i n gs e q u e n c eo fr e g e n e r a t i o n
points is stationary.
Proof. First, notice that the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately
from the second part of the lemma. Consider again the speciﬁcc y c l e[ti,t i+1[.
Suppose that ﬁrm installs the factory xti at time ti + δ instead of time ti. The
only change in the revenue function R due to postponing investment is between
ti and ti + δ. As xti ≤ x0, then t∗
i <t i, and the optimal price policy consists in





















i−1)2 denotes the revenue function when the new




revenue function when the new factory is installed at time ti. Again, the diﬀerence
in the cost function C is
∆C = a¯ xti(e−rti − e−r(ti+δ)) ∼ δra¯ xtie−rti
up to terms quadratic in δ. Then the net change is





i−1)(2ti − (ti + t∗
i−1)]
So, given ¯ xti, and the parameters of the model there is a unique ti for which the
net change (∆C − ∆R) cancels out. Q.E.D.
Thus, regardless of the exogenous factory size, the sequence of regeneration
points is stationary. Thus, the optimal price policy while aﬀecting the trajectory
of demand through time does not alter the stationarity property of the investment
pattern.
Let us now show how at the optimal price policy the regeneration point ti
depends on the parameters of the model. First, notice that the regeneration point
ti is set in such a way that the gain which derives from saving the discounted costs
exactly counterbalances the loss due to the gap between the existing factories and







Further, we know from the lemma that when ¯ xti <x 0 the switching point t∗
i is
out of the cycle [ti,t i+1[; when the reverse holds, then the switching point t∗
i is in
the interior of the cycle [ti,t i+1[; ﬁnally when ¯ xti = x0 the switching point t∗
i and
the regeneration point ti coincides. Accordingly, when the factory size ¯ xti is at










where ¯ xti = Xti − Xti−1,X ti−1 = A
2 t∗
i−1 and Xti = A
2 t∗
i = A







and the following holds:
Lemma 15 At the optimal price policy, the value of each regeneration point is
higher the higher the cost of investing (a and r) and the lower the growth parameter
of demand A.
Furthermore, it follows from the above ﬁndings that the optimal price policy
entails a sequence of cycles which are longer than the ones which would have
been selected by a planner facing demand levels growing exogenously at a rate
corresponding to the instantaneous monopoly price. If the monopolist would quote
at each instant of time the monopoly price, it would generate a linear demandtrajectory with slope A
2 in the demand-time space. We can ﬁnd out what is
the optimal solution of the planning problem corresponding to this expansion of
demand, viewed as in Manne (1961). To this solution, there corresponds an optimal
sequence of equally-spaced regeneration points. Starting with this sequence of
cycles, we can examine whether the optimal price policy which is adopted by the
monopolist leads to cycles which is larger or smaller than the ones resulting from
the planning solution provided by Manne.
Proposition 16 The optimal price policy entails a sequence of cycles which are
longer than the ones which would have been selected by a planner facing demand
levels corresponding to the instantaneous monopoly price.
Proof. First, notice that at the optimal price regime, the instantaneous monopoly
price is never quoted for the whole of the cycle. Then, the demand function can
be either increasing from the beginning of the cycle up to the switching point, and
then dampened up to the end of the cycle, when the optimal price policy entails
alternating both the monopoly and the constrained regimes, or dampened for the
whole of the cycle when the constrained regime is only quoted. Similarly, we
have seen that during the cycle resulting from the optimal regime, the factory size
cannot exceed or coincide with the demand level DM ¡
ti+1,p M(ti+1)
¢
. Then, at the
optimal cycle the factory size must be strictly smaller than DM ¡
ti+1,p M(ti+1)
¢
while, at the Manne solution, it is exactly equal to this magnitude. Accordingly,
given the size of the factory, at the optimal price policy, the cycle during which
demand levels are satisﬁed is longer then the one for which demand levels resulting
from the instantaneous monopoly price are served. Q.E.D.
3.4 Relation with the investment literature87
This paper is also related to other bulks of literature. First, it is concerned
with the application of microeconomic models of discontinuous adjustments (retail
inventories, expansion of capacity, cash balances, prices, durable goods etc.) to the
aggregate economic behavior. These microeconomics models were formulated in
the ﬁfties for retail inventories, and then applied for a variety of diﬀerent economic
problems, such as labor demand, durables goods and s.o. Recently, starting from
them, a new approach has been developed with the aim of investigating aggregate
implications of lumpy adjustments of equipment at a plant level (Blinder 1981,
Caplin 1985, Caplin and Spulber 1987, Caballero and Engel 1991, inter alia).
In particular, on the basis of Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel
(1991) have developed a methodology which allows to explain why the economic
behaviour of the aggregate investment displays a smooth pattern at the aggregate
level, while individual production units adjusting discretely and by large amount
according to a (S,s) policy. Although this approach has been conceived within the
framework of (S,s) policy, it can still be applied, with minor changes, to our model
and thus used for evaluating macroeconomic implications of investment policy in
term of capacity expansion as it is deﬁned at a plant level.
Second, the stationarity property we ﬁnd also holds in models concerned with
the optimal timing of replacement investments. These replacement models assume
that the technological progress is embodied in new equipment and accordingly ex-
amine when it is optimal replacing the oldest capital with the most recent vintages.
The endogenous scrapping time, namely the age of the oldest machines, which is
determined by the replacement timing selected by ﬁrms, is proved to be constant
over time, under several diﬀerent conditions (Malcomson 1975, Van Hilten 1991,
Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro 1997). Furthermore, when this optimal scrap-ping rule is used to examine phenomena which precisely result from replacing
old machines, such as job creation and job destruction, a cyclicity property still
holds even in models concerned with these phenomena (Boucekkine, del Rio and
Licandro 1999). Although our speciﬁcation, as it is, does not focus on the replace-
ment problem, our modeling ﬁts into the literature on replacement decision. With
slightly changes, we could assume that a factory is required to replace its equip-
ment which deteriorates with new machines rather then to expand its capacity to
meet a rising demand, and then evaluating at the optimal price policy the ensuing
timing of replacement.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have derived the optimal investment timing and pricing poli-
cies when the size of the investment is ﬁxed. It represents a natural extension
of the literature devoted to the capacity expansion problem which has ﬂourished
during the last decades. It brings a new element into the picture: the fact that the
ﬁrm can manipulate its price trajectory through time in order to accelerate, or to
dampen, demand expansion. We have proved that the introduction of this new
element does not alter the basic property of the optimal investment trajectory, as
derived in the capacity expansion literature, namely the constant-cycle property.
Furthermore we have shown that the optimal cycle is longer than the cycle cor-
responding to demand expansion which results from the monopoly price regime.
There is at least a further direction on which to build upon our model, namely
considering the replacement problem which can be faced by a factory when its
equipment deteriorates. Although this topic have been largely examined in a spe-
ciﬁc ﬁeld of growth theory, the so called vintage literature, nevertheless it could be89
Figure 5: Demand function in 3 diﬀerent price regime scenarios.
interesting to nest this problem in our model as speciﬁcc a s ei no r d e rt oe v a l u a t e
it from a microeconomic view point.Figure 6: Demand function and revenue function when the optimal price regime
involves alternating both the monopoly and the constrained regimes.91
Figure 7: Demand function and revenue function when the optimal price regime
only consists of the constrained regime.References
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